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LEADING A JUDGE TO WATER: IN SEARCH OF A
MORE FULLY FORMED WASHINGTON PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE
Ivan M. Stoner
Abstract: Under the public trust doctrine, a state must hold certain types of natural
resources, most particularly navigable waters and shorelands, in trust for the benefit of the
public. For that reason, courts closely scrutinize state actions impacting these public trust
resources. In Caminiti v. Boyle,1 the Washington State Supreme Court developed a test that
addresses situations where the State transfers control of public trust resources to private
parties. But no firm rule guides Washington courts where a state action impacts the public
trust without an alienation. This Comment examines the review Washington courts have
applied in such situations, and concludes that while certain core principles are extractable—
especially the principle that Washington courts’ role under the public trust doctrine does not
end with enforcing the non-alienation rule established in Caminiti—Washington public trust
law in this area remains vague. This Comment argues that reference to Wisconsin’s welldeveloped doctrine would clarify and improve Washington’s public trust doctrine, and
proposes an analytical framework inspired by that created in Wisconsin’s courts.

INTRODUCTION
In spite of (or perhaps because of) the froth that the public trust
doctrine has generated among academics,2 the Washington judiciary has
imposed it cautiously.3 Washington courts recognize that the doctrine
1. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987).
2. See 1 DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4:9
(2009) (“[L]aw review articles on the public trust doctrine are legion.”); James L. Huffman,
Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2007) (noting that the doctrine has been the subject of a “raging flood” of academic
commentary). In his treatise on environmental law, Professor William Rodgers maintains a
continually expanding footnote compiling notable public trust doctrine articles—the footnote now
spans several pages and contains dozens of articles. 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2.20, at 155 n.1 (1986 & Supp. 2009).
3. See 23 TIMOTHY BUTLER & MATTHEW KING, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.92, at 356 (2d ed. 2007) (“Washington courts have not gone as far as some
other states in defining the scope and reach of the public trust doctrine.”). Indeed, courts in
Washington have unfailingly upheld legislation against public trust challenges. See, e.g., Biggers v.
City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 169 P.3d 14 (2007) (four dissenters and Justice
Chambers—thus a majority of justices—concluding that public trust doctrine imposed no restraint
on ability of local governments to issue moratoria on shoreline building); Samson v. City of
Bainbridge Island, 149 Wash. App. 33, 202 P.3d 334 (2009) (holding that city’s amendment to its
shoreline master program prohibiting private dock construction within undeveloped harbor did not
violate public trust doctrine); infra Parts II.B, III.
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casts them as enforcers of a public trust in certain unique public
resources in which the public has an “overriding interest”4—navigable
waters and shorelands being the prototypical and historical examples5—
but how best to discharge this duty remains in some respects unsettled.
A landmark public trust case, Caminiti v. Boyle,6 established that the
State may not give up control of public trust lands unless it does so in
such a way that the public interest in those lands—the jus publicum—is
not substantially impaired.7 Caminiti did not, however, speak to
situations where the trust is compromised while remaining under state
control or even as a direct result of the State’s actions.
This raises a question: What limits does Washington’s public trust
doctrine impose on the State’s conduct when that conduct does not
transfer control of public trust land to private parties, but still impacts
the jus publicum? How, for example, should courts review state action
when the State wishes to reclaim public mudflats in order to build a
power plant? Or to fill a wetland in order to build a highway? This
Comment examines how courts review such government action under
the public trust doctrine, and suggests a path towards a more complete
framework. In the interest of brevity, situations where state action
impacts the jus publicum without transferring control to a private party
will generally be referred to as “non-alienation cases.”
Washington courts appear to recognize that their role as protectors of
the public trust involves more than an application of the principles
established in Caminiti v. Boyle. When evaluating non-alienation cases,
courts in Washington usually do more than simply confirm that an
alienation has not taken place.8 A careful reading of Washington courts’
treatment of non-alienation cases suggests certain principles that apply
in such situations, but the cases are limited both in number and in depth.
Wisconsin’s courts, on the other hand, have developed a five-factor
analysis with which they evaluate non-alienation cases.9 The important
public trust principles that sound faintly in Washington’s non-alienation

4. Samson, 149 Wash. App. at 58 n.8, 202 P.3d at 347 n.8; see also Orion Corp. v. State, 109
Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987) (noting that public trust doctrine requires that the
State maintain dominion over Washington’s public property held in trust for the people).
5. See Rettkowski v. Dept. of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (1993) (“The
public trust doctrine evolved out of the public necessity for access to navigable waters and
shorelands.”).
6. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987).
7. Id. at 670, 732 P.2d at 994–95.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73–74 (Wis. 1957); infra Part IV.
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jurisprudence are clearly enunciated in Wisconsin’s. This Comment
argues that Washington’s courts should look to Wisconsin public trust
law to distill their treatment of non-alienation cases into a coherent
framework. Wisconsin’s approach addresses the special considerations
required in non-alienation cases and reflects the principles articulated in
Washington’s still-developing doctrine.
Part I of this Comment introduces the public trust doctrine. Part II
examines the doctrine’s development in Washington up to the seminal
Caminiti v. Boyle decision, and closely considers Caminiti. Part III
analyzes non-alienation cases since Caminiti. Part IV introduces
Wisconsin’s well-developed public trust doctrine jurisprudence and
covers Wisconsin courts’ response to the non-alienation case problem.
Finally, Part V argues that in such situations, Washington judges should
employ a factor analysis similar to that created by their colleagues in
Wisconsin.
I.

MURKY WATERS; FERTILE GROUND

Often vague and always diverse, public trust doctrine philosophies
have developed throughout the United States into a host of different
textures and levels of refinement. Washington courts therefore have
plentiful, though not always crystal clear, examples to draw from when
they evaluate Washington’s own public trust doctrine. This Part
introduces the public trust doctrine, outlines its basic principles, and
briefly addresses academic and judicial attitudes towards the doctrine.10
Additionally, with the aim of giving the reader a sense of how
refinements to Washington’s public trust law would fit into the larger
national picture, this Part provides snapshots of several areas of public
trust law that have developed differently from state to state.

10. A full review of public trust law in the United States is beyond the scope of this Comment.
This introduction, however, provides important foundation. More comprehensive treatments are
available. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 2, § 2:20, at 155–68; SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2,
§§ 4:9–:20. Histories of the doctrine can be found in Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475–91 (1970), and
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope
of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989).
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“It is a doctrine with both a radical potential and indifferent
prospects”11

Whether or not “black letter” law can be said to exist in a doctrine as
malleable12 as the public trust doctrine is debatable, but some basic
principles have been around long enough to grow barnacles. The
doctrine is old enough to be considered classical,13 has a long history in
the United States,14 and relates closely to the general rule that title to
lands beneath a state’s internal tidal and navigable waters rests in that
state.15 At the doctrine’s core are the ideas that the public has a powerful
interest in lands beneath navigable and tidal waters,16 and that the state
holds such lands in trust for the people.17 Recognizing this, courts have
split ownership interests in public trust lands into two parts: private
property interests (the jus privatum) and public interests (the jus
publicum).18
11. RODGERS, supra note 2, § 2:20, at 155.
12. See id. (terming the doctrine “resoundingly vague”).
13. Scholarship on the public trust doctrine nearly always notes the doctrine’s roots in the codes
of the Roman emperor Justinian. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property
and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV.
631, 632 (1986) (“The public trust doctrine is based on an amorphous notion that has been with us
since the days of Justinian—the notion that the public possesses inviolable rights in certain natural
resources.”); Sax, supra note 10, at 475 & n.15; Ewa M. Davidson, Comment, Enjoys Long Walks
on the Beach: Washington’s Public Trust Doctrine and the Right of Pedestrian Passage Over
Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV. 813, 830–32 (2006). There has been criticism of the accuracy
of that line of descent. See Huffman, supra note 2, at 12–19. Nonetheless, it has been commonly
accepted by modern courts as a starting point when considering the doctrine. See Davidson, supra,
at 830 (“The judiciaries of ten states, including Washington, recognize the Institutes [of Justinian]
as an ancient codification of the public trust doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).
14. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 284–86 (1997) (citing early public trust
cases and commentary).
15. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (looking to public trust cases to
address extent of state title to lands washed by non-navigable tidewaters). In the original thirteen
states, state ownership of submerged lands was acquired from England through revolution. Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1894). States later admitted to the Union acquired identical rights to
submerged lands under the equal-footing doctrine. Phillips Petrol., 484 U.S. at 474 (quoting
Shively, 152 U.S. at 57).
16. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 285 (noting “the principle in American law recognizing the
weighty public interests in submerged lands”); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 668–69, 732
P.2d 989, 994 (1987).
17. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
18. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 284 (quoting Shively, 152 U.S. at 13); see also MATTHEW
HALE, A TREATISE DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM (n.d.), reprinted in STUART A.
MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 370, 389–90 (3d ed.
1888) (“[T]he jus privatum, that is acquired by the subject either by patent or prescription, must not
prejudice the jus publicum, wherewith public rivers or the arms of the sea are affected for public
use.”). Lord Hale’s treatise, written in the late seventeenth century, was a starting point for the
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The jus publicum has historically included public rights to use
navigable waters for navigation, commerce, and fishing19—the so-called
“traditional triad” of public trust rights.20 While a state may freely
convey the jus privatum to private parties, such transfers are subject to
an implied reservation of the jus publicum.21 The public trust doctrine
thus preserves continuing public rights in public trust resources even in
the face of apparent alienation by the State.22
The seminal decision involving an alienation of public trust lands is
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1892 Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.23
Commentators and courts have generally agreed that Illinois Central
represents the prototypical situation that the public trust doctrine exists
to prevent, where “a small, well-organized private interest procure[s]
legislation that g[ives] it monopoly privileges in order to extract wealth
from the diffuse and unrepresented public.”24 The case originated from
the Illinois legislature’s decision to deed to a railroad more than 1000
acres of the Chicago harbor—a property as large as “all the merchandise
docks along the Thames at London.”25 When a later legislature moved to

earliest American public trust scholars. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of
the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
799, 826–27 n.121 (2004). It was likewise relied upon in the first American public trust doctrine
cases. See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 74–76 (N.J. 1821).
19. See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452.
20. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983).
21. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 458; see also Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 72 (stating that the sovereign cannot
“intrude upon the common property . . . , the enjoyment of it is a natural right which cannot be
infringed or taken away”).
22. See, e.g., Arnold, 6 N.J.L. 1 (recognizing public right to gather oysters on New Jersey beaches
even where pre-independence land grant had purported to convey oyster bed to private individual).
23. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). For a thorough history of Illinois Central and an assessment of its
“lodestar” position in United States public trust doctrine law, see Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18,
at 853–87. State courts, including Washington’s, see infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text,
have almost unfailingly used Illinois Central as the foundation for fleshing out their own public
trust doctrines. See, e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1988)
(“Illinois Central remains the leading case regarding public rights in tide and submerged lands
conveyed by the state.”); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d
1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983) (“Illinois Central . . . is the seminal case on the scope of the public trust
doctrine and remains the primary authority today.”); Shepard’s Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 44
S.E. 39, 41–42 (N.C. 1903); see also West Indian Co. v. Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007, 1018 (3d
Cir. 1988) (citing Illinois Central as a generally understood common law rule of the United States).
24. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18, at 805; see also, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust
Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 425 (1987) (noting that though there are difficulties in judging the
adequacy of consideration, the city had probably been “ripped off” by the railroad).
25. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 454.
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undo the transfer, the railroad cried foul, and a suit resulted in which
both parties asserted title.26
The litigation worked its way to the Supreme Court, which rejected
the railroad’s claim on the grounds that the State’s public trust
responsibilities prevented it from transferring the land in the first place.27
Justice Stephen Field, writing for the Court, declared that:
[S]uch property is held by the State, by virtue of its sovereignty,
in trust for the public. The ownership of the navigable waters of
the harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of public
concern to the whole people of the State. The trust with which
they are held, therefore, is governmental, and cannot be
alienated, except . . . when parcels can be disposed of without
detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining.28
The State’s transfer of the lands under the harbor of Chicago—a
property “of immense value to the people of the State of Illinois”—was
therefore necessarily revocable.29 Anything else would be “a gross
perversion of the trust.”30
The public trust doctrine, however, has never been limited to the
bedrock tenets of Illinois Central. Rather, as a creature of the common
law, the doctrine is capable of expansion to meet the public need.31
Courts usually do not hesitate to entertain public trust claims even when
no transfer of public land has occurred.32 Even in early cases, courts
recognized that the public rights encompassed by the jus publicum may
extend beyond the traditional triad33 and that the jus publicum’s scope
26. Id. at 439.
27. Id. at 453 (“A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has never been
adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if
not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation.”).
28. Id. at 455–56.
29. Id. at 454.
30. Id. at 455.
31. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
32. See, e.g., Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984)
(applying public trust doctrine to agency’s approval of hazardous waste facility); United Plainsmen
Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461, 463 (N.D. 1976) (holding
that public trust doctrine is not restricted to conveyances of real property and applying doctrine to
water allocation decision); see also State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d 825, 827 (N.C. 1988)
(“Under the public trust doctrine, each state could regulate or dispose of its tidal lands, provided
that it could be done ‘without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters.’”
(emphasis added)).
33. See, e.g., Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 129 (Mass. 1909) (“[I]t
would be too strict a doctrine to hold that the trust for the public . . . is for navigation alone. It is
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may reach beyond tidal and navigable waters.34 The Vermont Supreme
Court put it elegantly:
[T]he public trust doctrine retains an undiminished vitality. The
doctrine is not fixed or static, but one to be molded and extended
to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was
created to benefit. The very purposes of the trust have evolved in
tandem with the changing public perception of the values and
uses of waterways.35
Accordingly, the doctrine manifests itself diversely throughout the
nation, conforming to the changing public needs and judicial traditions
of different states.36
The public trust doctrine stands distinct from the various regulatory
regimes37 that protect the public interest in waters and underlying lands
in that the judiciary, rather than the legislature, largely created and
developed it.38 This judicial scrutiny of legislative policy judgments39—
an arena in which great deference is normally granted40—has fascinated
academics, giving rise to both ringing praise41 and spirited criticism.42
wider in its scope, and it includes all necessary and proper uses, in the interest of the public.”); see
also infra notes 57–63 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Bohn v. Albertson, 238 P.2d 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (extending public trust to
lands flooded by the San Joaquin River); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw.
2000) (extending public trust to groundwater).
35. State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1130 (Vt. 1989) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
36. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1
(2007) (reviewing the public trust doctrine in eastern states, and noting the “richness and complexity
of [the various states’] public trust philosophies”); infra Part I.B.
37. See, e.g., Water Resources Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.54.005–.920 (2008)
(mandating that allocation of water between competing uses be based on securing maximum net
benefits for the people of the state); Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 90.58.010–.920 (2008) (requiring that uses and developments proposed for Washington’s
shorelines be consistent with statutory shoreline management policies and local shoreline
management plans).
38. Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in
Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 524–25 (1992).
39. Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 698, 958 P.2d 273, 283 (1998) (“[C]ourts
review legislation under the public trust doctrine with a heightened degree of judicial
scrutiny . . . .”).
40. State v. Heiskell, 129 Wash. 2d 113, 122, 916 P.2d 366, 370 (1996) (“Ultimately, it is not this
Court’s function to question the wisdom of a[] [legislative] enactment, unless a constitutional
impediment is present. We will not inquire into the policies underlying a clear legislative
enactment.”).
41. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 38, at 594, 596 (calling the doctrine “a powerful tool to protect
the public interest in tidelands and shorelands” that “provides important protection for coastal
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Professor Joseph Sax’s call to use the doctrine as a tool for protection of
natural resources43 has been particularly influential,44 and over the last
forty years a few state courts have taken the doctrine in a decidedly
“environmentalist” direction.45 More commonly, however, the
environmental aspect of the doctrine has met with tepid judicial
response, and by and large no great revolution has occurred to match
Professor Sax’s vision.46
resources from harmful private development”); Sax, supra note 10, at 509, 560 (arguing that the
doctrine is a “medium for democratization” that protects a “disorganized and diffuse majority” from
the “self-interested and powerful minorities” that “often have an undue influence on the public
resource decisions of legislative and administrative bodies and cause those bodies to ignore broadly
based public interests”).
42. William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional
Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45
UCLA L. REV. 385, 404 (1997) (“[T]he [public trust] doctrine has been criticized as a backwardlooking, antidemocratic vestige whose time, if it ever existed, has passed.”); see, e.g., James L.
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19
ENVTL. L. 527, 533 (1989) (“By misconceiving the doctrine [as consisting of more than a simple
easement], our modern courts have confused the concepts of public rights, police power, and
constitutional rights. As a consequence, the courts have threatened basic values of constitutional
democracy and individual liberty.”); Lazarus, supra note 13, at 658 (“[T]he public trust
doctrine . . . is now, at best, superfluous and, at worst, distracting and theoretically inconsistent with
new notions of property and sovereignty . . . .”).
43. Sax, supra note 10, at 474 (“Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust
doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content which might make it useful as a tool of
general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource
management problems.” (footnote omitted)); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine
from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 188 (1980) (“The central ideal of the
public trust is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but
without formal recognition such as title.”).
44. See Denise E. Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, 38
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,114, 10,125 (2008) (noting the increasing use of the public
trust doctrine since the 1970s and Professor Sax’s status as the “catalyst” for this revival); Carol M.
Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 352 (1998) (crediting
Professor Sax with “usher[ing] in” the modern revival of the public trust concept).
45. Both the California and Hawaii supreme courts have handed down prominent public trust
doctrine decisions in which they cited Professor Sax’s work and held that the doctrine demands
affirmative state action to preserve the environment. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court,
658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (expressly applying the public trust doctrine to limit stream
diversions that were harming the environment); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,
455 (Haw. 2000) (holding that public trust doctrine requires the State to consider cumulative impact
of water use allocations on the trust, and to implement reasonable mitigation measures, including
the use of alternative sources).
46. See J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Common Law of “The Fragile Land System,”
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2005, at 5–6, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/
profiles/ruhl/2005-FragileLandSystem20NREFall.pdf (noting that the public trust doctrine has not
been widely embraced by state courts as a vehicle for judicial intervention in natural resource
management policy); James L. Wescoat, Jr., Submerged Landscapes: The Public Trust in Urban
Environmental Design, from Chicago to Karachi and Back Again, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 435, 461
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In sum, whatever the controversies surrounding its content, scope, and
theoretical underpinnings, the public trust doctrine is a firmly established
part of the common law.47 The doctrine generally protects water-based
activities on water resources, but is capable of being extended farther. It
invites active use by environment-focused lawyers, but, being often
“buried in the deeper recesses of the complaint,”48 the doctrine has been
more readily embraced by academics than courts. It certainly exists
throughout the United States, but its contours—even within a particular
jurisdiction—are often hard to define.
B.

United States Courts Take Diverse Approaches to the Jus Publicum

The boundary of the public trust has often been linked to the wash of
the tide,49 but depending on which court’s decision applies, the landward
limit of the jus publicum may be the low water mark,50 the high water
mark,51 the vegetation line,52 or even the reach of the waves in winter.53
Other jurisdictions have expanded the trust beyond the sea to all surface
waters,54 to groundwater,55 and to non-water resources.56 Suffice it to say
the public trust doctrine’s scope and application can vary dramatically
(2009) (“While it is an exaggeration to say that law review articles on the public trust doctrine are
almost as numerous as the number of decisions that cite Illinois Central, the number of public trust
cases has not been as large as hoped or feared by various commentators.”).
47. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 669, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987). The notion that federal
law imposes a minimum or “floor” public trust doctrine on the states has been advanced by several
commentators. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 36, at 4–5 (characterizing the public trust doctrine
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central as the “default minimum standard
for the states”); Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 459 (arguing that the public trust doctrine stems from
the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause and becomes binding on new states at statehood).
48. RODGERS, supra note 2, § 2.20, at 155.
49. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894) (“At common law, the title and the
dominion in lands flowed by the tide were in the King for the benefit of the nation.”); see also City
of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 364–66 (Cal. 1980) (recounting history of public
rights in California tidelands).
50. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1099–100 (Mass. 1981) (“. . . or 100
rods from mean high water, if lesser.”).
51. Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 607–08 (N.H. 1994).
52. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 & n.1 (N.J. 1984) (“. . . or
where there is no vegetation[,] to a seawall, road, parking lot or boardwalk.”).
53. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 773–74, 776 (Haw. 1977).
54. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that
Montana’s public trust doctrine extends to “any surface waters that are capable of recreational use”).
55. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445–47 (Haw. 2000) (“[T]he
public trust doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or distinction.”).
56. See, e.g., Parsons v. Walker, 328 N.E.2d 920, 926–27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (extending public
trust protections to public park).
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from state to state. The following is a representative tour designed to
give a sense of courts’ differing treatments of the public trust doctrine
throughout the United States.
It is common for states’ public trust doctrines to differ in the range of
public activities protected. For instance, Mississippi has an expansive
list of purposes to which public trust lands may be put, including
navigation, transportation, commerce, fishing, bathing, swimming, other
recreational activities, development of mineral resources, environmental
protection, enhancement of marine life, sea agriculture, and “no doubt
others.”57 Alaska, on the other hand, has maintained a narrow scope,
limiting its doctrine to the three traditional uses of navigation,
commerce, and fishing.58 Scientific study is a public trust use in
California,59 as is hunting in Wisconsin.60 New Jersey’s courts protect
the right to travel over private lands to access public trust areas,61 but
Arkansas’ courts do not.62 The Supreme Court of Iowa has situated itself
between these two extremes, holding that the public’s right to access
trust lands is protected only to the extent that the State can prove at least
some ownership interest in the land that would provide access.63
The extent to which a state has an affirmative duty to preserve public
trust lands and waters also varies widely. Hawaii’s public trust doctrine
is directly based on language in its constitution64 and imposes powerful,
substantive checks on the State’s regulation of water use.65 In contrast,
the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the public trust doctrine
provides only a presumption that where the legislature conveys public
trust land, it does not do so “in a manner that would impair public trust
57. Cinque Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986), aff’d 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
58. See City of Saint Paul v. State, 137 P.3d 261, 263 n.8 (Alaska 2006).
59. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003).
60. R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 787–88 (Wis. 2001).
61. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) (“[W]here use of
dry sand is essential or reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the ocean, the doctrine warrants the
public’s use of the upland dry sand area subject to an accommodation of the interests of the
owner.”).
62. State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Ark. 1980) (“It is not disputed that riparian
landowners on a navigable stream have a right to prohibit the public from crossing their property to
reach such a stream.”).
63. See Larman v. State, 552 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996).
64. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“The State has an obligation to protect, control and regulate
the use of Hawaii’s water resources for the benefit of its people.”).
65. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 504–05 (Haw. 2000) (holding that the
public trust imposes a fiduciary duty on the State to “actively and affirmatively protect, control and
regulate” water resources).
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rights.”66 In that state, the legislature can overcome this presumption—
and consequently extinguish all public rights in the property—by clearly
indicating that it wishes to convey a parcel without reservation of any
public trust rights.67
More specifically pertinent to this Comment are the standards under
which courts review legislative action under the public trust doctrine. In
Idaho, courts take a “close look” at a State action to determine whether it
complies with the public trust doctrine.68 In Alaska, grants of exclusive
rights to harvest natural resources are subject to “close scrutiny.”69
Maine’s courts review legislative restraints on public trust rights for a
rational basis,70 but look for a “particularly demanding standard of
reasonableness” when they assess that rationality.71 Courts are
sometimes remarkably unclear as to the level of scrutiny they apply.72
Washington’s standard of review is discussed below in Parts II and III.
As this section has shown, the national setting in which Washington
courts must determine the ambit of the Washington public trust doctrine
is decidedly piebald. It is not without good reason that the doctrine has
been described as “not easily researchable” with “few experts” and “not
many more who claim to be experts.”73 This variety also shows,
however, that when Washington courts are called upon to develop,
refine, or clarify the public trust doctrine, they are the beneficiaries of a
rich field of different approaches and philosophies.

66. Gwathmey v. State, 464 S.E.2d 674, 684 (N.C. 1995) (holding that because there is no
constitutional basis for the public trust doctrine in North Carolina, the doctrine only serves as a rule
of statutory construction, and will not invalidate express legislative acts).
67. See id. In Washington, however, it appears that even express legislation cannot abrogate the
trust, and that the legislature can never relinquish the trust by a transfer of property. See Orion Corp.
v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987).
68. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Idaho
1983).
69. Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 494 (Alaska 1988) (referring specifically to natural
resources listed in the Alaska Constitution’s common use clause).
70. See State v. Haskell, 955 A.2d 737, 740 (Me. 2008).
71. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607 (Me. 1981).
72. See Brian E. Gray, The Uncertain Future of Water Rights in California: Reflections on the
Governor’s Commission Report, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 43, 60–61 & n.114 (2005) (asserting that
in National Audubon Society, the California Supreme Court identified no less than five different
standards of review, including “a feasibility criterion, a public interest test, a rough form of costbenefit analysis, a balancing approach, and a purely ‘considerational’ requirement analogous to a
[National Environmental Policy Act] or [California Environmental Quality Act] analysis of
reasonable alternatives”).
73. RODGERS, supra note 2, § 2.20, at 155–56.

Stoner post DTP.doc (Do Not Delete)

402
II.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

5/17/2010 10:30 AM

[Vol. 85:391

WASHINGTON’S EARLY CASES CULMINATED IN A TEST
THAT ADDRESSES TRUST ALIENATIONS

As in other states, the public trust doctrine has existed in Washington
common law since statehood, though it has evolved considerably from
its late nineteenth-century beginnings.74 Early cases, decided when
Washington was a resource-rich frontier state, concerned themselves
mainly with the efficient development of Washington’s natural
resources.75 Later cases expanded the doctrine,76 and it currently
includes at a minimum public rights to navigate, engage in commercial
activity, fish, boat, swim, and water ski,77 as well as an interest in
clamming on public78 (but not on private)79 land.
The standard by which Washington courts review legislative action
under the public trust doctrine has likewise evolved. Before 1987’s
Caminiti v. Boyle, the extent of this review was largely uncertain.
Caminiti ushered in Washington’s modern public trust era by developing
a test that enables courts to respond to alleged alienations of public trust
lands. This Part traces the development of the public trust doctrine in
Washington up to and including Caminiti, focusing on the manner and
degree to which courts review legislative action.

74. See Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 669, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987). For an account of
the public trust doctrine’s role and history in Washington by a leading Washington public trust law
scholar, and a still-valuable discussion of the doctrine’s potential future in this state, see Professor
Ralph Johnson’s 1992 article, supra note 38. A compilation of Professor Johnson’s published work
(including his many articles and symposia on public trust law) is available online through the
University of Washington’s Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library. Cheryl Nyberg, Ralph Johnson:
1923–1999 (2001), http://lib.law.washington.edu/ref/raljohnson.html.
75. See State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 171, 135 P. 1035, 1040 (1913) (“The state has invited
investment in [public trust] lands upon the theory that, in private ownership, all land lying back of
the inner harbor line or the line of ordinary navigability would be reclaimed and put to useful
purposes.”).
76. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 640–41, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987) (“Recognizing
modern science’s ability to identify the public need, state courts have extended the doctrine beyond
its navigational aspects.”).
77. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 669, 732 P.2d at 994 (quoting Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d
306, 316, 462 P.2d 232, 239 (1969)). According to the Caminiti Court, jus publicum activities also
include “other related recreational purposes generally regarded as corollary to the right of
navigation and the use of public waters.” Id.
78. Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 Wash. App.
441, 451, 101 P.3d 891, 896 (2004).
79. State v. Longshore, 141 Wash. 2d 414, 428, 5 P.3d 1256, 1263 (2000).
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Dicta in Washington State’s Early Public Trust Doctrine Cases Are
Inconsistent Regarding the Extent to Which the Doctrine Limits
State Action

An examination of Washington’s early public trust doctrine
jurisprudence reveals no consistent approach with respect to the
doctrine’s limits on state action. The first case to deal with public trust
concerns in Washington was Eisenbach v. Hatfield,80 in which a
landowner sued to stop construction of structures on privately owned
tidal land seaward of his property.81 The Washington State Supreme
Court held that the landowner could not, as a riparian owner, stop state
action in the navigable waters adjoining his estate.82 Though it ruled
against the landowner, the Eisenbach Court noted the distinction
between the jus privatum, which might be conveyed to individuals, and
the “public right of navigation and fishing,” which could not.83
Eisenbach was not alone among early Washington decisions in
recognizing the concept of the jus publicum. The state supreme court
noted in State v. Sturtevant84 that the State held the right of navigation
“in trust for the whole people” of Washington.85 Later, in Hill v.
Newell,86 the Court quoted language from a then-leading California
public trust doctrine case that went even further, to the effect that any
state interest in public trust land was “subservient” to public rights in the
jus publicum, and that the State was incapable of disposing of public
trust lands in a manner prejudicial to those rights.87 Other early courts
expressed similar sentiments, with varying degrees of forcefulness.88
Occasional suggestions that the judiciary has no role in enforcing
what form the state trusteeship should take, however, offset this early

80. 2 Wash. 236, 26 P. 539 (1891).
81. Id. at 237, 26 P. at 539.
82. Id. at 253, 26 P. at 543–44.
83. Id. at 240–41, 26 P. at 539–40.
84. 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913).
85. Id. at 165, 135 P. at 1037.
86. 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915).
87. Id. at 231, 149 P. at 952 (quoting People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 82 (1913), and noting
that that court’s language was “in effect the holding of this court”).
88. See, e.g., City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 499, 64 P. 735, 737
(1901) (noting paramount public right in use of navigable waters that sovereign could neither
destroy nor abridge), quoted with approval in Madson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 40
Wash. 414, 419, 82 P. 718, 720 (1905); cf. Hulet v. Wishkah Boom Co., 54 Wash. 510, 517, 103 P.
814, 816 (1909) (noting public right to navigate, and holding that that right could not be
“unnecessarily interfer[ed]” with by a private party).
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language. The Eisenbach Court indicated that it could not “deny the
power of the state to deal with its own property as it may deem best for
the public good.”89 Further, well into the twentieth century, Washington
courts accepted without objection state policies that would result in the
destruction of public trust lands.90 Certainly no early court invoked the
public trust doctrine in order to restrict state action with regard to the jus
publicum.
In sum, early public trust cases in Washington contain interesting
dicta, but fail to yield a consistent theory about the extent to which state
action is reviewable under the public trust doctrine. Unambiguous
recognition of public trust constraints on state action would not emerge
until the Supreme Court of Washington accepted Benella Caminiti’s
petition for review in 1987.
B.

Caminiti v. Boyle: The Beginning of Washington’s Modern Public
Trust Doctrine

In Caminiti v. Boyle, the Washington State Supreme Court explicitly
considered a challenge to state action under the public trust doctrine for
the first time.91 Caminiti involved a challenge to a state statute that
allowed owners of waterfront property to build recreational docks
without payment to the State.92 The petitioners argued that the statute
effectively relinquished state control over public trust resources, and that
those resources would be gobbled up by uncontrolled proliferation of
private docks.93 While the petitioners lost on the merits, they succeeded
in persuading the Court to affirmatively recognize a Washington public
trust doctrine,94 and since then Justice James Andersen’s opinion for the
89. Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 253, 26 P. 539, 544 (1891), quoted in Grays Harbor
Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83, 90, 102 P. 1041, 1044 (1909). The Eisenbach Court also
noted that the states succeeded to the British Parliament’s “absolute control” over public trust rights.
Id. at 240–41, 26 P. at 539–40; see also Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge, 49 Wash. 127, 131–32,
94 P. 922, 923 (1908) (“[T]he state has full power to dispose of [tide lands], subject to no
restrictions save those imposed upon the Legislature by the Constitution of the state and the
Constitution of the United States.”); cf. Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 275, 75 P. 807, 809
(1904) (“It is no doubt true that the sovereign authority may control and regulate the use of
navigable waters . . . .”).
90. See, e.g., Harris v. Hylebos Indus., Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 770, 786, 505 P.2d 457, 466 (1973)
(“The legislative intent regarding the use of tidelands in harbors of cities is manifestly that . . . the
filling and reclaiming of the tidelands which have been sold to private parties shall be
encouraged.”).
91. Johnson, supra note 38, at 535.
92. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 663, 732 P.2d 989, 991 (1987).
93. See id. at 671, 732 P.2d at 995.
94. Id. at 669–70, 732 P.2d at 994.
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eight-justice majority has been the foundation for Washington’s
doctrine.
After reaffirming its earlier holdings that the State of Washington has
the power to transfer the jus privatum in tidelands and shorelands,95 the
Court turned to the jus publicum and set about formulating
Washington’s legal standard for public trust alienation claims. In doing
so, the Court relied heavily on language from the United States Supreme
Court’s Illinois Central decision, which also involved a state giving up
control of public trust resources.96 The Caminiti Court adopted the
principles from Illinois Central: The State can no more give away the jus
publicum interest in public trust land than it can give away its police
powers, and regardless of who holds title to public trust land,
sovereignty and dominion over such land always remain with the State.97
Further, the Washington State Supreme Court looked to Illinois
Central to formulate a test that would identify state violations of the
public trust doctrine. From Justice Field’s wall of nineteenth-century
prose, Justice Andersen plucked the following articulation of the United
States Supreme Court’s holding:98
The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never
be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining.99
Working from this passage, the Caminiti Court declared that when a
violation of the doctrine is alleged, Washington courts must inquire:
(1) [W]hether the State, by the questioned legislation, has given
up its right of control over the jus publicum and (2) if so,
whether by so doing the State (a) has promoted the interests of
the public in the jus publicum, or (b) has not substantially
impaired it.100
Applying the first prong of the new test, the Caminiti Court noted that
by enacting the law allowing private dock construction, the Legislature
95. Id. at 666–67, 732 P.2d at 993.
96. Id. at 669–70, 732 P.2d at 994–95; see supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
97. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 669, 732 P.2d at 994 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 453 (1892)).
98. As have many other courts. See, e.g., People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 82 (Cal. 1913); State
v. Head, 498 S.E.2d 389, 392 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Natland Corp. v. Baker’s Port, Inc., 865 S.W.2d
52, 59 (Tex. App. 1993).
99. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 670, 732 P.2d at 994 (quoting Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453).
100. Id. at 670, 732 P.2d at 994–95.
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had not conveyed title to any public trust lands and had given up
“relatively little” control over the public trust.101 Further, the Court
explained that the State retained ultimate control because it could revoke
landowners’ ability to build docks at any time.102
Because some control had been alienated, however, the Court went on
to apply the test’s second prong. At least to a limited degree, reasoned
the Court, allowing construction of private docks promoted public
interest in the jus publicum.103 Such activity was, after all, consistent
with a public good articulated in the Shoreline Management Act:
“recognizing and protecting private property rights consistent with the
public interest.”104 Additionally, the Court saw no reason to draw a
distinction between encouraging use of public waters from public docks
and encouraging the same from private docks.105 Finally, the Court
observed that there was no impairment of the jus publicum because
recreational docks were not permitted to block access to public
beaches.106 In sum, the Court held that though the dock statute
relinquished some state control over public trust land, the statute mildly
promoted, or at least did not impair, public interest in the jus publicum.
Caminiti is a fixture in Washington public trust law and its test allows
courts to respond to alienations of the jus publicum.107 But Washington’s
101. Id. at 672, 732 P.2d at 995.
102. Id. at 673, 732 P.2d at 996.
103. Id. However, a recent court of appeals decision held that while dock building is permissible
under the public trust doctrine, the doctrine confers no positive right to do so. See Samson v. City of
Bainbridge Island, 149 Wash. App. 33, 59, 202 P.3d 334, 347 (2009) (“Samson misconstrues the
public trust doctrine by implying that the doctrine enshrines a right to construct individual, private
docks, just because a private property owner could use that dock for navigation purposes.”).
104. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 673, 732 P.2d at 996 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020).
105. Id. at 674, 732 P.2d at 996.
106. Id.
107. See Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 696, 169 P.3d 14, 22 (2007)
(citing Caminiti); State v. Longshore, 141 Wash. 2d 414, 427, 5 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2000) (citing
Caminiti); Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 699, 958 P.2d 273, 283 (1998) (applying
test); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 638–39, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987) (citing
Caminiti); Samson, 149 Wash. App. at 58–60, 202 P.3d at 347–48 (citing Caminiti); Citizens for
Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 569–72, 103 P.3d 203, 205–06 (2004)
(applying test); Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124
Wash. App. 441, 451–52, 101 P.3d 891, 896–97 (2004) (applying test).
Interestingly, however, the Caminiti test has never been affirmatively used to restrain state action.
Courts have only given teeth to Caminiti’s broad statements about the inalienable public interest in
public trust lands against private parties, doing so to block takings claims. See Esplanade Properties,
LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Washington law); Orion, 109 Wash.
2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062. In Orion, a developer had purchased tidelands intending to dredge and fill
them. 109 Wash. 2d. at 626, 747 P.2d at 1065. The State later designated the lands as “shorelines of
statewide significance” and refused to allow the developer to proceed. Id. at 627–29, 747 P.2d at
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public trust doctrine has not remained dormant since Caminiti. As the
next Part will show, while later courts have looked mainly to the
Caminiti test for guidance, they have also gone beyond Caminiti and
explored principles for deciding non-alienation public trust cases.
III. NON-ALIENATION PUBLIC TRUST DECISIONS APPLY
REVIEW BEYOND THE CAMINITI TEST
The first prong of the Caminiti test asks whether the State has given
up its right of control over the jus publicum;108 the test is constructed
such that courts should apply the second prong only if they answer “yes”
to the first.109 In non-alienation cases—where, by definition, the State
has not given up jus publicum control—a strict application of the test
will therefore always end at the first prong.
It is not clear, however, what this means. Of the three reported
decisions in which courts considered non-alienation cases, only one
dismissed a public trust claim based on a negative answer to the
Caminiti test’s first prong.110 The other two, including one by the
Washington State Supreme Court, went beyond the test’s strict
parameters.111 The following will explore those three non-alienation
cases.
A.

Weden v. San Juan County: The Washington State Supreme Court
Provides Scrutiny Beyond the Caminiti Test in a Non-Alienation
Case

In 1998’s Weden v. San Juan County,112 the Supreme Court of
Washington tackled a non-alienation public trust case. Weden involved a
public trust doctrine challenge to a San Juan County ordinance
prohibiting use of motorized personal watercraft.113 The challengers, a

1066–67. The developer brought a takings claim, but the Court sided with the State, concluding that
the developer never had a right to fill the land, having purchased it subject to the paramount public
interest in the jus publicum. Id. at 640–42, 747 P.2d at 1072–73.
108. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 670, 732 P.2d at 994.
109. Id. at 670, 732 P.2d at 994–95.
110. Citizens, 124 Wash. App. at 575, 103 P.3d at 207–08.
111. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 699–700, 958 P.2d at 283–84; Wash. State Geoduck, 124 Wash.
App. at 452, 101 P.3d at 897.
112. 135 Wash. 2d 678, 958 P.2d 273 (1998).
113. Id. at 684, 958 P.2d at 276. Personal motorized watercraft are commonly and generically
known as “jet skis.” Personal Watercraft Coal. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 430
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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trade association and a group of individuals and businesses, asserted that
the ban violated their public trust right to navigate.114 They directed the
Court’s attention to an article by the late University of Washington
Professor Ralph Johnson for the proposition that the doctrine was “like a
constitutional principle.”115
Justice Charles Johnson, writing for the majority, drew heavily from
Professor Johnson’s article, declaring that “courts review legislation
under the public trust doctrine with a heightened degree of judicial
scrutiny, as if they were measuring that legislation against constitutional
protections.”116 Justice Johnson’s grounding for “heightened scrutiny” in
the “universally recognized need to protect public access to and use of
such unique resources as navigable waters, beds, and adjacent lands”
also came from Professor Johnson’s article.117
Turning to the facts, the Court seemed to agree with the respondents
that use of motorized personal watercraft is an activity encompassed by
the jus publicum, but nevertheless held that the San Juan County
ordinance did not violate the public trust doctrine.118 Because the
114. Brief of Respondents at 51–53, Weden, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 958 P.2d 273 (No. 64776-3)
(“[T]he Ordinance substantially impairs the public interest of all members of the public to use and
access the navigable waters, which the public trust doctrine encourages and protects . . . .”).
115. Id. at 52 (quoting Johnson, supra note 38, at 527 n.9). Professor Johnson, in turn, drew this
conclusion from Caminiti. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 527 n.9 (citing Caminiti for the
proposition that “the doctrine, like a constitutional principle, constrains the power of the
legislature”).
116. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 698, 958 P.2d at 283 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Johnson, supra note 38, at 526–27).
117. Id. (quoting Johnson, supra note 38, at 525). The theoretical justification for courts’ power
to override legislative decisions under the public trust doctrine is hotly debated. See supra notes 41–
42. Washington courts have occasionally observed that the public trust doctrine is “partially
encapsulated” in article XVII, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution, which reserves State
ownership of “the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state.” Rettkowski v. Dep’t of
Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (1993); see also Wash. State Geoduck Harvest
Ass’n v. Wash. State Dept. of Natural Res., 124 Wash. App. 441, 451, 101 P.3d 891, 896 (2004)
(describing public trust doctrine as “essentially” a constitutional protection). And there is at least
some support for the argument that the duties imposed by the public trust doctrine spring directly
from the Washington State Constitution. See Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d
683, 695, 169 P.3d 14, 21 (2007) (implying that the “duty imposed by the public trust doctrine” is a
product of courts’ interpretation of article XVII, section 1). The interconnectedness of article XVII,
section 1 and the public trust doctrine is particularly apparent in the frequency with which courts
undertake intertwining discussions of the two sources of law. See, e.g., id. at 694–96, 713–14, 169
P.3d 14, 21–22, 30–31 (both lead opinion and dissent discussing article XVII, section 1 and the
public trust doctrine together); Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 717, 958 P.2d at 292 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
118. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 699, 958 P.2d at 283 (emphasizing that the jus publicum includes
“other related recreational purposes generally regarded as corollary to the right of navigation and
the use of public waters”).
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ordinance represented a regulation of the jus publicum rather than an
alienation, the Court’s application of the Caminiti test unsurprisingly
came up negative—a regulation does not “give up” control.119
Scrutiny, however, did not end there. The Court appeared to weigh
the ordinance’s negative consequences on the jus publicum against the
positive. On the one hand, the ban prohibited a recreational use protected
by the public trust doctrine, but on the other, it left the county’s waters
otherwise open to access by the entire public.120 Furthermore, the
County had made findings that use of motorized personal watercraft was
“inconsistent with the protection and preservation of the wildlife which
inhabit the waters and refuges of the County.”121 The Court concluded
that it would stretch the public trust doctrine too far to protect an activity
that “actually harms and damages” the jus publicum.122
In sum, Weden endorses scrutiny beyond the Caminiti test in nonalienation cases. It also provides some guidance as to factors not
identified in Caminiti that Washington courts should look to when they
carry out that review: (1) whether the public trust resource remains open
to the entire public, and (2) whether the State’s action preserves the jus
publicum.
B.

Non-Alienation Decisions After Weden Have Applied Still
Different Kinds of Scrutiny

Two decisions after Weden, both by Division II of the Washington
Court of Appeals, have addressed non-alienation cases: Washington
State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Washington State Department of
Natural Resources,123 and Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management
v. State.124 Like Weden, both decisions announced use of a heightened
scrutiny standard.125 But while the court in Washington State Geoduck
followed Weden in progressing beyond the first prong of Caminiti, the
court in Citizens did not.
In Washington State Geoduck, a group of commercial geoduck
harvesters argued that the Department of Natural Resources violated the

119. Id.
120. Id. at 699, 958 P.2d at 283–84.
121. Id. at 687, 958 P.2d at 277.
122. Id. at 700, 958 P.2d at 284.
123. 124 Wash. App. 441, 101 P.3d 891 (2004).
124. 124 Wash. App. 566, 103 P.3d 203 (2004).
125. Id. at 570–71, 103 P.3d at 205; Wash. State Geoduck, 124 Wash. App. at 451, 101 P.3d at
896.
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public trust doctrine by auctioning exclusive geoduck126 harvesting
rights on public land to the highest bidder.127 Not so, said the court. The
court explained that while Washington’s public trust doctrine includes a
public interest in geoducks living in state-owned lands,128 the auction
practices at issue did not violate the public trust doctrine.129 The court’s
analysis centered on the Caminiti test. Focusing on the test’s first prong,
the court discussed how the State retained control over this aspect of the
public trust by maintaining a variety of safeguards.130 As in Weden,
however, the court proceeded beyond the first prong and emphasized the
public good promoted by the public trust regulation at issue.
Where the Weden Court looked to factors not specifically endorsed in
Caminiti, the Washington State Geoduck court applied the Caminiti
test’s second prong. The court concluded that far from substantially
impairing the public trust, the Department of Natural Resources’
regulation of commercial geoduck harvesting promoted sustainable use
and natural regeneration of the resource.131 Such results bolstered values
that the public trust doctrine traditionally protects: “recreation,
commerce, and commercial fishing.”132
In Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management, several citizens
groups invoked the public trust doctrine to challenge two laws enacted
through the initiative process that prohibited various hunting and
trapping practices.133 In Washington, no court had addressed whether
hunting is a public trust activity, or whether terrestrial wildlife is a
public trust resource.134 The court concluded that it did not have to
126. “The Pacific geoduck clam (Panopea abrupta) is the largest intertidal clam in the world,
weighing up to ten pounds, and reaching life spans of up to 163 years.” Wilber v. State, 187 P.3d
460, 461 n.1 (Alaska 2008). Geoducks can command high market prices. Alaska Trademark
Shellfish, LLC v. State, 91 P.3d 953, 954 (Alaska 2004).
127. Wash. State Geoduck, 124 Wash. App. at 448, 101 P.3d at 895.
128. Id. at 451, 101 P.3d at 896.
129. Id. at 452, 101 P.3d at 897.
130. Id. (noting that no title was conveyed, that the Department of Natural Resources remained
responsible for appraising shellfish bed resources, that resource bidders were required to provide an
estimate of the resources they would remove, and that the state had the authority to include in leases
terms deemed “necessary to protect the interests of the state”).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 568, 103 P.3d 203,
204 (2004). Initiative 655 made it unlawful to hunt black bear using bait, or to hunt black bear,
cougar, bobcat, or lynx with dogs. See WASH. REV. CODE § 77.15.245 (2008). Initiative 713 made it
unlawful to use certain forms of traps to capture mammals for certain purposes. See id.
§§ 77.15.192–.198.
134. Citizens, 124 Wash. App. at 570, 103 P.3d at 205.
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decide the issue, because even if hunting was encompassed by the jus
publicum the citizens groups’ public trust challenge still failed.135 The
court undertook a careful and detailed application of the first prong of
the Caminiti test, examining whether the State had given up control over
Washington’s terrestrial wildlife.136 Because the laws in question were
state-mandated restrictions on the public’s right to use a resource,
explained the court, they could not represent the State “giving up”
control over Washington’s wildlife, but rather amounted to an
assumption of greater control.137 In other words, the Caminiti test’s first
prong blocked the Citizens plaintiff’s suit because no alienation had
occurred. Unlike the Weden Court or the Washington State Geoduck
court, the Citizens court did not go farther.
Citizens did, however, produce an ambitious concurrence by Chief
Judge Christine Quinn-Brintnall. Judge Quinn-Brintnall was concerned
that the scrutiny to which Washington courts hold the legislature under
Caminiti was insufficient to protect the interests of future generations in
the jus publicum.138 In order to remedy this problem, Judge QuinnBrintnall advocated a considerable overhaul of the Caminiti test, arguing
that an element of “future interest” should be considered, and that courts
should focus their analysis on the second prong, rather than the first, and
look to whether a state action would harm the public trust before
addressing whether the State had relinquished control.139 Finally, Judge
Quinn-Brintnall argued that no weighing of interests could sufficiently
represent the enduring nature of the public trust, and that courts should
strike down any law that would result in “unacceptably high” damage to
a public trust resource.140
In sum, Washington courts can be called on to strike down legislation
that involves state choices concerning how the jus publicum will be
135. Id.
136. Id. at 573–75, 103 P.3d at 206–08.
137. Id. at 575, 103 P.3d at 207–08.
138. Id. at 576–77, 103 P.3d at 208 (Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., concurring).
139. Id. at 577–78, 103 P.3d at 209. The new test that Judge Quinn-Brintnall advocated—as she
modified it to apply to a law passed by initiative—is as follows:
[T]o determine whether an initiative complies with the public trust doctrine, we must
determine: (1) whether the people by initiative have given up the State’s right/duty to control
the jus publicum and (2) if so, whether this relinquishment (a) promotes the future interests of
the public in the jus publicum, or (b) substantially impairs the public’s future interest in these
resources.
Id. at 577, 103 P.3d at 209.
140. Id. at 578, 103 P.3d at 209 (“[W]e do not evaluate the merits of the reasons for the action or
the professed needs of those supporting the use or exhaustion of the resources held in the public
trust.”).
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used, rather than the alienation of that land to private parties. It appears
to remain an open question, however, what courts should do when they
are so called. In Citizens, the majority’s scrutiny of a non-alienation case
ended with the first prong of the Caminiti test. But in Weden,
Washington State Geoduck, and Judge Quinn-Brintnall’s Citizens
concurrence, it did not.
A careful reading of Weden and Washington State Geoduck suggests
that review beyond Caminiti’s first prong might include asking whether
the state action: (1) left the jus publicum open to the entire public;141 (2)
had positive effects on the public trust resource at issue;142 (3) had a
positive impact on the jus publicum that outweighed the negative impact
on those members of the public whose public trust rights it limited;143 or
(4) satisfied the elements of the Caminiti test’s second prong by either
promoting or not substantially impairing the jus publicum.144
It is not clear from Washington’s non-alienation case law, however,
which of these concerns, if any, courts are required to address. What is
clear is that Washington’s non-alienation jurisprudence is meager. The
few cases detailed in this Part represent the totality of Washington law in
this area.
IV. WISCONSIN’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE PROVIDES
STRONG NON-ALIENATION JURISPRUDENCE
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine is well developed,145 and
Wisconsin’s courts have specifically considered public trust challenges
where state action does not involve alienation of public trust land. In
their approach to resolving such cases, Wisconsin courts have attempted
to strike a balance between flexibility and enforcement of public trust
values. One Wisconsin appellate court reasoned that “no single public
interest in the use of navigable waters, though afforded the protection of
141. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 699, 958 P.2d 273, 283–84 (1998).
142. See id. at 700, 958 P.2d at 284 (implying legislation that prevents activities that “actually
harm[] and damage[] the waters and wildlife of this state” would generally be upheld under the
public trust doctrine).
143. See Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 Wash.
App. 441, 449, 101 P.3d 891, 895 (2004).
144. See id. at 452, 101 P.3d at 897.
145. Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and Submerged
Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 925 n.116 (2007); accord Sax,
supra note 10, at 509 (“The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has probably made a more conscientious
effort to rise above rhetoric and to work out a reasonable meaning for the public trust doctrine than
have the courts of any other state.”); John Quick, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Wisconsin, 1 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 106 (1994).
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the public trust doctrine, is absolute. Some public uses must yield if
other public uses are to exist at all. The uses must be balanced and
accommodated on a case by case basis.”146 Recognition of this principle
has led Wisconsin courts to develop a rubric for determining when the
State may exchange one public purpose for another.
Wisconsin established principles for striking down unprincipled
transfers of public trust land to private parties much earlier than
Washington.147 An 1896 case, Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land &
Improvement Co.,148 like Illinois Central, involved a seemingly corrupt
giveaway of public trust land to private interests.149 In 1891, one James
Reynolds obtained a special legislative grant of the lakebeds of two
lakes, which he was to drain, ostensibly to protect public health.150 In
fact, Mr. Reynolds had formed a land development corporation and
transferred his rights in the lakebeds to the corporation so the beds could
be used for development.151 When a riparian owner challenged the grant,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected claims that it was bound by the
bald legislative declaration of public purpose, and held that grants of
public trust land were void when they were made for “private purposes,
and for the sole benefit of private parties.”152
The Court refined its analysis in State v. Public Service
Commission153 to address non-alienation cases. Public Service
Commission involved a challenge to the legislature’s grant of a small
portion of Lake Wingra’s bed to the City of Madison.154 The land grant
was made in order to develop a lakeside public park, and the City of
Madison planned to dredge and fill approximately four acres (one and
one-fourth percent) of the lake.155 The proposal’s obvious impacts on the
jus publicum included, among other things, a reduction of the fishproducing potential of the lake by 1600 to 2000 pounds per year.156 The

146. State v. Vill. of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
147. As detailed above, the Washington judiciary’s first foray into this component of the public
trust doctrine occurred in 1987. See supra Part II.B.
148. 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896).
149. See Sax, supra note 10, at 509 (“Priewe . . . contains the strong implication of legislative
corruption.”).
150. Priewe, 67 N.W. at 919, 921.
151. Id. at 921–22.
152. Id. at 922.
153. 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957).
154. Id. at 72.
155. Id.
156. Id.

Stoner post DTP.doc (Do Not Delete)

414

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

5/17/2010 10:30 AM

[Vol. 85:391

Court relied on a five-factor inquiry to determine whether the lakebed
grant was acceptable under the public trust doctrine. Upholding the
grant, the Court reasoned that:
1. Public bodies will control the use of the area. 2. The area will
be devoted to public purposes and open to the public. 3. The
diminution of lake area will be very small when compared with
the whole of Lake Wingra. 4. No one of the public uses of the
lake as a lake will be destroyed or greatly impaired. 5. The
disappointment of those members of the public who may desire
to boat, fish or swim in the area to be filled is negligible when
compared with the greater convenience to be afforded those
members of the public who use the city park.157
Later Wisconsin courts have relied on the Public Service Commission
Court’s analysis in other non-alienation public trust cases. For example,
the same year it decided Public Service Commission, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied the factors to uphold another lakebed grant to the
City of Madison, upon which the city planned to build a public theater
and civic center.158 In another case that noted the factors, an appellate
court upheld a local ordinance setting aside a portion of the lake for
public water ski exhibitions that had been a tourist attraction in the area
for some twenty-four years.159
Wisconsin courts treat these factors as flexible guidelines rather than
an exclusive checklist.160 And, as Professor Sax noted, if the State were
to show “that any or all of its five tests are not useful guidelines, but that
public interest problems are more usefully examined by reference to
other factors, the court would undoubtedly modify its position.”161
The Public Service Commission factors have also been picked up
outside of Wisconsin. In Paepke v. Public Building Commission,162 an
Illinois Supreme Court decision, a group of homeowners brought suit to
enjoin the use of a portion of a public park as the site for a school.163
Noting the Wisconsin factors with approval, the Court refused to enjoin

157. Id. at 73–74.
158. City of Madison v. State, 83 N.W.2d 674, 675, 678 (Wis. 1957).
159. State v. Vill. of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
160. See City of Madison, 83 N.W.2d at 678 (referring to Public Service Commission factors, but
also considering whether changed public trust use would improve public’s ability to enjoy “scenic
beauty” of a resource).
161. Sax, supra note 10, at 519.
162. 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970).
163. Id. at 13.
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the change in land use.164 The Idaho Supreme Court also referenced the
Wisconsin factors in developing Idaho’s public trust doctrine, and seems
to have used them to construct its own standard of review.165 Professor
Sax praised the factors for their relative clarity in the often opaque
public trust field.166
This is not to say, however, that the Wisconsin approach has escaped
criticism entirely. Some commentators have rankled at the absence of an
overriding preservation factor,167 and one observed that “[l]ike many
multi-part balancing tests it could do with an accompanying instruction
booklet.”168 On the whole, however, the Public Service Commission
Court’s five factors are held in high regard, both by courts and by
Professor Sax, the nation’s preeminent public trust scholar.
V.

WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A MULTIFACTOR ANALYSIS FOR NON-ALIENATION CASES

The public trust doctrine’s vague nature and expansive possibilities
have led many commentators to argue for creative expansions of the
doctrine in areas where they see public need.169 The doctrine’s
interesting, and possibly shaky, theoretical foundations have been
another fruitful source of debate.170 This Comment’s goals are more
modest: to clarify Washington’s public trust doctrine, rather than expand
or justify it.

164. Id. at 19 (“[W]e believe that standards such as [the Public Service Commission factors]
might serve as a useful guide for future administrative action.”).
165. See Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1092–93
(Idaho 1983) (quoting State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957)).
166. See Sax, supra note 10, at 517 (asserting that the Wisconsin factors are “as close as judicial
statement has to a specific enumeration of a set of rules for implementation of the public trust
doctrine”).
167. See, e.g., Serena M. Williams, Sustaining Urban Green Spaces: Can Public Parks Be
Protected Under the Public Trust Doctrine?, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 23, 42 (2002); Peter Egan,
Comment, Applying Public Trust Tests to Congressional Attempts to Close National Park Areas, 25
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 717, 739–40 (1998) (“[A]ny trust area could be destroyed incrementally,
in small stages.”).
168. Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV.
239, 269 (1992) (referring to the test as applied in Paepke). Professor Cohen also noted, however,
that from an economic perspective, the test contains “no major substantive error” so long as the last
factor is decisive. Id.
169. See Huffman, supra note 2, at 4–5 (collecting examples of authors arguing for expansions of
the public trust doctrine in the environmental arena, as well as in less common directions such as
regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum and intellectual property).
170. See id. at 5–6 (collecting articles).
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The public trust doctrine puts judges in an unusual position—it
requires them to question legislative policy decisions on substantive
grounds.171 Washington’s non-alienation cases show that inconsistent
analysis is predictable in such situations unless courts are informed by a
well-defined rule.172 This Part presents a multi-factor analysis, inspired
by Wisconsin’s non-alienation jurisprudence, that would allow
Washington courts to consistently apply meaningful scrutiny in cases
that the Caminiti test does not reach.
A.

Judicial Review of State Action Under Washington’s Public Trust
Doctrine Is Not Limited to the Caminiti Test

The Caminiti Court directed Washington courts addressing public
trust claims to ask: “(1) whether the State, by the questioned legislation,
has given up its right of control over the jus publicum and (2) if so,
whether by so doing the State (a) has promoted the interests of the public
in the jus publicum, or (b) has not substantially impaired it.”173 By its
terms, this test does not provide for further analysis once a court
concludes that it faces a non-alienation case. Washington judges actually
faced with non-alienation cases, however, have more often than not
offered public trust law analysis beyond the non-alienation question.174
There are two ways to understand this treatment of the test. The first
is to dismiss courts’ analysis beyond Caminiti as dicta and conclude that
the State can never violate the public trust doctrine in non-alienation
cases. This seems to have been the view of the majority in Citizens,
which concluded that the state regulation at issue maintained public trust
control, and rejected appellants’ public trust claim on that basis.175 A
purely outcome-centered review of Washington’s body of non-alienation
cases points in the same direction: Despite their apparent analysis
171. See State v. Heiskell, 129 Wash. 2d 113, 122, 916 P.2d 366, 370 (1996) (“Ultimately, it is
not this Court’s function to question the wisdom of a[] [legislative] enactment, unless a
constitutional impediment is present. We will not inquire into the policies underlying a clear
legislative enactment.”). Though such scrutiny of legislative policy choices is more usual where
constitutional protections are involved, the public trust doctrine’s constitutional pedigree is
debatable in Washington. See supra note 117.
172. Compare, e.g., Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 575,
103 P.3d 203, 207–08 (2004) (majority opinion) (offering no scrutiny beyond first prong of
Caminiti test) with id. at 578, 103 P.3d at 209 (Quinn-Brintnall, C.J. concurring) (arguing that
public trust doctrine requires courts to strike down any law that would result in “unacceptably high”
damage to natural resources without considering any public good that the law would accomplish).
173. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 670, 732 P.2d 989, 994–95 (1987).
174. See supra Part III.
175. See supra notes 133–137 and accompanying text.
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beyond the Caminiti test, Washington courts considering non-alienation
claims have uniformly held that the State did not violate the public trust
doctrine.176 A plausible conclusion from this trend is that no matter how
negatively a state action affects the jus publicum, no public trust
violation can occur so long as the State maintains control of the trust
lands.
A closer look at Caminiti and Washington’s non-alienation cases,
however, suggests that a different understanding is better: While
Caminiti sets the rule for alienation cases, the State also has enforceable
public trust duties in non-alienation cases, and courts must address those
cases with analysis beyond the Caminiti test.
The circumstances of Caminiti support such an interpretation. The
Caminiti petitioners’ public trust suit was based on their argument that
the State had impermissibly given up control of public trust resources.177
The Court agreed that it was presented with an alienation case, and
developed a test that addresses alienation situations.178 Principles of
judicial minimalism suggest that in so doing, the Court was leaving the
non-alienation question for later courts to answer.179
This understanding is consistent with most Washington courts’
analyses of non-alienation cases. Neither the Washington State Supreme
Court in Weden nor the Division II Court of Appeals in Washington
State Geoduck let the fact that the State had maintained control over jus
publicum settle the matter. Instead, each court also considered the
positive effects of the State’s challenged action.180 Chief Judge QuinnBrintnall took a related position in her passionate Citizens concurrence,
arguing that courts should strike down state actions that “unacceptably”
compromise the jus publicum regardless of whether the action had
alienated the jus publicum.181 The Citizens majority stands alone in its
176. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 958 P.2d 273 (1998) (holding that San
Juan County ordinance prohibiting use of motorized personal watercraft did not violate public trust
doctrine); Citizens, 124 Wash. App. 566, 103 P.3d 203 (2004) (holding that law passed by initiative
did not violate public trust doctrine by putting restrictions on the hunting and trapping of certain
wild animals); Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 Wash.
App. 441, 101 P.3d 891 (2004) (holding that Department of Natural Resources’ auctioning of
exclusive rights to harvest geoducks on public land did not violate public trust doctrine).
177. Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 672, 732 P.2d at 995.
178. See id. (holding that by enacting the statute at issue, the Legislature had given up at least
some right of control over the jus publicum); supra Part II.B.
179. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT, at ix–xi (1999) (“A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves many things
undecided.”).
180. See supra Part III.
181. See Citizens, 124 Wash. App. at 575–78, 103 P.3d at 208–09 (Quinn-Brintnall, C.J.,
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suggestion that the Caminiti test is the only legal tool a Washington
public trust plaintiff has.182
If an alienation of control under Caminiti were the only way in which
the public trust doctrine could be violated, the doctrine would allow state
action inimical to public trust values to take place without the
heightened judicial scrutiny the doctrine demands. A worst-case scenario
might involve a legislative boondoggle destroying public trust lands with
little or no public benefit. A lake-draining or shoreline-reclamation
project that was the pork equivalent of Alaska’s “Bridge to Nowhere,”183
for example, would pass the Caminiti test because it would not represent
alienation of state control over public trust resources. Nonetheless, it is
precisely the type of state action that implicates the principles
undergirding the public trust doctrine—the “universally recognized need
to protect public access to and use of such unique resources as navigable
waters, beds, and adjacent lands.”184
The Caminiti test is a pillar of Washington’s public trust
jurisprudence. It ensures that the jus publicum remains in public hands
unless the State can show that a transfer will not harm the public interest.
But Caminiti does not represent the totality of Washington’s public trust
doctrine. Heightened public trust scrutiny is required in non-alienation
cases as well.185 Washington’s appellate courts, however, have not
addressed head-on what heightened scrutiny means in those
circumstances. Consequently, when a non-alienating state action
concurring); supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text. Judge Quinn-Brintnall also argued that
courts should strike down state action that harmed the jus publicum without considering the “merits
of the reasons for the action or the professed needs of those supporting the use or exhaustion of the
resources held in the public trust.” Id. at 578, 103 P.3d at 209. Such uncompromising review
surpasses the level of review proposed in this Comment, but speaks to a judicial recognition that the
public trust doctrine should not end with the Caminiti test.
182. The Citizens majority’s failure to progress beyond the alienation question is probably best
explained by appellants’ decision to argue at length that regulations of hunting and trapping passed
by initiative were abdications of state control over the jus publicum. See Brief of Appellant at 39–
41, Citizens, 124 Wash. App. 566, 103 P.3d 203 (No. 73739-8); Appellants’ Reply at 4–10,
Citizens, 124 Wash. App. 566, 103 P.3d 203 (No. 73739-8).
183. See Shailagh Murray, For a Senate Foe of Pork Barrel Spending, Two Bridges Too Far,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2005, at A8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/20/.AR2005102001931.html (recounting controversy over $223 million
in earmarked federal funding for the “Bridge to Nowhere”—an Alaskan bridge connecting “one
small town to a tiny island”).
184. Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 698, 958 P.2d 273, 283 (1998).
185. See id. (announcing “heightened degree of judicial scrutiny” standard in non-alienation
case); Citizens, 124 Wash. App. at 570–71, 103 P.3d at 205 (same); Wash. State Geoduck Harvest
Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 Wash. App. 441, 451, 101 P.3d 891, 896 (2004)
(same).
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implicates public trust lands or rights, trial courts have little concrete
guidance.
B.

What Does Public Trust Scrutiny Look Like Beyond Caminiti?
Wisconsin Suggests an Answer

Fortunately, Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine jurisprudence points
the way forward for Washington courts. Compared to Washington’s
uncertain jurisprudence in this area, Wisconsin courts have been
paragons of clarity. And while a few other states have comparably robust
public trust traditions,186 Wisconsin’s jurisprudence not only most
clearly addresses the non-alienation case problem, it also fits
comfortably with Washington’s existing jurisprudence.187
To reprise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s factors for evaluating
non-alienation cases are:
(1) Whether public bodies will control the use of the area;
(2) Whether the area will be devoted to public purposes and
open to the public;
(3) Whether the diminution of the public trust resource will be
very small when compared with the whole of the resource;
(4) Whether any one of the public uses of the resource will be
destroyed or greatly impaired;
(5) Whether the new resource use is of greater public benefit
than the old.188
Building from these five factors would allow Washington courts to more
meaningfully analyze legislation that impacts the public trust but does
not represent a public trust giveaway. This Section proposes modified
Wisconsin factors and argues that the proposed factors fit with
Washington courts’ treatment of non-alienation cases.
1.

Moving From Lake Wingra to Puget Sound: A Proposed
Adaptation of Wisconsin’s Factors to Washington

In order to adapt the Wisconsin factors to Washington, this Comment
proposes two modifications. First, some of the Wisconsin Supreme

186. See Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1089
(Idaho 1983) (“Massachusetts, Wisconsin and California are the three states with the wealth of
authority on the subject.”).
187. See infra Part V.B.2.
188. See State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73–74 (Wis. 1957); supra notes 153–157
and accompanying text.
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Court’s factors are specifically formulated to analyze state actions that
diminish lakes. Because the purpose of adopting the Wisconsin factors is
to provide Washington courts with a broadly applicable analytical rubric,
this narrow language should be dropped. Second, the first Wisconsin
factor—involving public control over the public trust—should be
dispensed with altogether as already adequately protected by Caminiti.
This Comment does not presume to offer a replacement for the Caminiti
test, merely a complement to it. That being the case, there is no reason
for the factors to duplicate what Washington courts are already bound to
consider.
With those changes made, a Washington court addressing a public
trust case would first apply the Caminiti test, asking whether an
alienation occurred. If it answered in the affirmative, the court would
proceed to the second prong of the test, and decide whether the
alienation had promoted, or at least not impaired, the public’s interest in
the jus publicum. If, however, the court concluded that no alienation had
taken place, it would consider the following:
(1) Whether the public trust resource will remain available to the
entire public;
(2) Whether, and to what extent, the state action will positively
or negatively impact the public trust resource;
(3) Whether any one public trust use will be destroyed or greatly
impaired;
(4) The overall positive public impact of the state action.
The above factors mirror to an extent the principles articulated in the
second prong of the Caminiti test, but they are more flexible. Where the
second Caminiti prong unequivocally forbids alienations that impair the
public’s interest in the jus publicum, the factors allow for a more
nuanced approach, appropriate for situations where the State has not
given up public trust control. Where the State has not transferred public
trust resources to private parties the jus publicum is less likely to be
compromised, and the State should be allowed more leeway in its
decisions.
Wisconsin courts apply their factors in a way that is not unbending or
exclusive, and Washington courts should use the proposed factors in the
same way. Rather than being treated “as a check-list, resolving the issue
in favor of whichever column has the most checks,”189 the factors should
be regarded as tools for determining the fundamental question of
whether the State is adequately managing the jus publicum “in trust for
189. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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the people.”190 Depending on the type and magnitude of public trust
concerns involved, different factors should weigh more or less heavily.
Factor three, for example, would weigh much more heavily against a law
that eliminated fishing (a widespread, traditional public trust use) in
Puget Sound (a large and significant public trust resource) than it would
against a law that eliminated water skiing (a less common, though
recognized, use) on Lake Union (a smaller resource).
Currently, courts facing non-alienation cases are in the position of
deciding between an ad hoc public trust analysis,191 the second Caminiti
prong,192 or a total rejection of further scrutiny.193 Adopting the proposed
factors would eliminate this confusion and provide Washington courts
with a structured, flexible, and tested approach to non-alienation cases.
2.

The Proposed Factors Fit Well with Washington Jurisprudence
and Address Important Public Trust Concerns

Though Washington’s non-alienation public trust cases are few in
number, a close reading reveals that Washington courts have already
considered each of the proposed factors in some form. Furthermore, the
factors address venerable public trust principles and will improve courts’
scrutiny of legislative action in non-alienation cases, while still allowing
for some flexibility in state decisions about the use of public trust
resources. The following sections illustrate the factors’ groundings in
Washington’s public trust jurisprudence and the public trust principles
they address.
a.

“Whether the public trust resource will remain available to the
entire public”

This first factor encourages the State to maintain a public trust
resource’s public nature even if the resource’s specific use is modified.
The ongoing public character of public trust resources has long been a
concern of courts in Washington and elsewhere.194 In Weden, the Court
remarked with approval that the San Juan County ordinance at issue left

190. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987).
191. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 699–700, 958 P.2d 273, 283–84 (1998).
192. See Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 Wash.
App. 441, 452, 101 P.3d 891, 897 (2004).
193. See Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 575, 103 P.3d
203, 207 (2004).
194. See supra notes 21, 86–88 and accompanying text.
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the county’s waters “open to access by the entire public.”195 The
Caminiti Court also considered this factor, noting that the law it upheld
did not allow construction of private docks that inhibited public access
to the jus publicum.196
b.

“Whether, and to what extent, the state action will positively or
negatively impact the public trust resource”

This factor speaks to the seemingly self-evident principle—
unaddressed by a Caminiti analysis in non-alienation cases—that the
continuing existence of public trust resources is a necessary component
of the public’s interest in them. The Washington State Geoduck court
recognized that the State has a duty to preserve public trust resources,197
and the Weden Court suggested that courts will enforce this duty,
explaining that “it would be an odd use of the public trust doctrine to
sanction an activity that actually harms and damages the waters and
wildlife of this state.”198 This factor will militate in favor of state actions
designed to preserve public trust resources, such as the regulations in
Weden, Washington State Geoduck and Citizens. Conversely, it should
encourage courts to take a skeptical look at any state action that would
significantly harm a public trust resource, even if the State retains
control.
c.

“Whether any one public trust use will be destroyed or greatly
impaired”

The third factor recognizes that a core component of the public trust
doctrine is the public’s right to use public trust resources.199 This
consideration weighed against the State in Weden, in that the County had
prohibited a particular public use (operation of motorized personal
watercraft).200 It might also have weighed against the State in Citizens

195. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 699, 958 P.2d at 283–84.
196. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 674, 732 P.2d 989, 996 (1987).
197. Wash. State Geoduck, 124 Wash. App. at 448–49, 101 P.3d at 895 (“[T]he public trust
doctrine . . . obligates the State to balance the protection of the public’s right to use resources on
public land with the protection of the resources that enable these activities.”). The Washington State
Geoduck court also approvingly noted that the Department of Natural Resources’ regulation of
geoduck harvesting facilitated natural regeneration of the resource. Id. at 452, P.2d at 897.
198. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 700, 958 P.2d at 284.
199. See Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 669, 732 P.2d at 994 (recognizing that the “jus publicum
interest” can be understood as comprising certain rights of use).
200. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 699, 958 P.2d at 283.
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had the court found that the initiatives at issue went so far as to “greatly
impair” Washingtonians’ ability to use a public trust resource.
d.

“The overall positive public impact of the state action”

The final factor allows courts to consider a state action’s public
benefit beyond traditional public trust concerns. This factor is
undoubtedly the one that gives courts the least concrete guidance. Its
inclusion is nonetheless critical in that it allows for the possibility of
radical changes to public trust property. Any rule by which courts
constrain government action under the public trust must be formulated
such that it does not unalterably trap Washington in a particular
configuration of policy judgments as to what the public good is.201 It is
the public trust doctrine’s flexibility that has allowed it to remain vibrant
despite constant societal change.202 Even in situations where a state’s
action might eliminate a public trust resource altogether, a showing of
sufficient public benefit under the fourth factor might allow a court to
rule in favor of the State,203 though the State would bear a heavy burden.
CONCLUSION
The non-alienation test developed by the Washington State Supreme
Court in Caminiti is too narrow to fully inform court action in all
situations where the public trust is implicated. Washington courts have
taken tentative steps in applying the public trust doctrine where the State
has not given up control over the jus publicum, but they need to be more
explicit about what they are doing. Clearer law in this area would help
courts, legislators, and agencies more accurately evaluate the constraints
the public trust doctrine puts on state action. Wisconsin’s welldeveloped public trust law supplies a formula that both comports with
Washington’s muddy jurisprudence, and is also “as close as judicial
statement has to a specific enumeration of a set of rules for
implementation of the public trust doctrine.”204 Washington should
follow Wisconsin’s lead.
201. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text; cf. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621,
640–41, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987) (“Recognizing modern science’s ability to identify the public
need, state courts have extended the doctrine beyond its navigational aspects.”).
203. Though critical of the Wisconsin factors for their vagueness, Professor Cohen suggested that
the test is most charitably understood, and most substantively correct, when the final factor is
“decisive.” See Cohen, supra note 168, at 269.
204. See Sax, supra note 10, at 517.

